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 In this work, Kurt Holukoff examines three formal approaches to representing 
valid inferences in reasoning regarding obligation and its cognates: deontic logic. He 
argues that an appropriate formalization of deontic logic should take genuine moral 
dilemmas seriously, be capable of representing trumping-like reasoning, and not make 
the naturalistic fallacy valid as a matter of logic. The three systems he investigates are, 
the Standard Deontic logic, a Relevant Deontic logic, and Schotch and Jennings’ multiple 
moral accessibility relations Deontic logic. The Standard Deontic logic has seemingly 
insurmountable problems representing both fruitful reasoning from an inconsistent set of 
obligations and trumping-like reasoning. Moreover, the naturalistic fallacy is valid in the 
Standard Deontic logic. The Relevant deontic logic that the author examines is capable of 
representing fruitful reasoning from an inconsistent set of obligations and does not make 
valid the naturalistic fallacy. However, the author argues that the Relevant deontic logic 
needs some revisions in order to represent trumping-like reasoning. Likewise, the author 
finds that Schotch and Jennings’ Deontic logic is capable of representing fruitful 
reasoning from an inconsistent set of obligations. However, in order to represent 
trumping-like reasoning, revisions to Schotch and Jennings’ Deontic logic are apparently 
required. Similar revisions are seemingly required to block the naturalistic fallacy, which 
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Chapter One 
Obligation as Moral Necessity: in Classical Terms 
 
In 2004, Jillian Searle1 and her two young children were enjoying breakfast on 
the Thai island of Phuket. However, within the span of a few moments, the tsunami th
devastated Indonesia and Thailand forced Searle into make a horrifying decision. Searle 
realized that with the waters rising and threatening to sweep her two young children out 
to sea, she did not have the ability to hold on to both children. If she did not let go of one 
child, all three of them would perish.  
at 
                                                
Luckily for Searle, one of her children was five years old and she thought that he 
at least had a slight chance of surviving on his own, whereas the other child was still a 
baby. Searle let go of the older child. Although he was nearly swept out to sea, 
fortunately he was able to hold onto a door to keep his head above water. Searle and her 
baby also survived the tsunami. While the decision that Searle was forced to make was 
indeed horrific, it could have been worse if there were no relevant considerations to help 
her select one child over the other. Perhaps they could have been twins, or both toddlers. 
It seems that if the decision had to be made under those conditions it should be 
considered an impossible moral situation or alternatively, a genuine moral dilemma. 
Consider then, a reasonable person, with a normal range of emotions and 
sympathies, who has discovered that such genuine moral dilemmas can occur and have 
occurred. Since, at least initially, genuine moral dilemmas may be explicated as 
inconsistent sets of moral demands, in all of her future moral inquiries, if she follows the 
norms of appropriate reasoning as taught her in her Logic 101 course, she is entitled to 
infer that anything and nothing is morally obligatory and permissible. For Explosion, by 
 
1 From BBC website, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4137053.stm, accessed on August 20, 2007 
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which we mean the rule, that from an inconsistent set of premises anything follows, is a 
valid inference in classical logic and its modal affiliates. However, any type of moral 
inquiry which actually results in justifying such conclusions, i.e., that anything and 
nothing is morally obligatory and permissible, would likely be anathema to any person 
who believes that moral demands are meaningful and in some sense binding on people 
like her. 
At this point, if we want to avoid such a disastrous account of moral inquiry, it 
seems that we have, broadly speaking, two options. First, we may deny the possibility of 
genuine moral dilemmas. Secondly, we may reject the validity of explosion in moral 
inquiry. The first option seems to run counter to the sad facts of moral experience: people 
have been, and unfortunately will likely continue to be, faced with unavoidable decisions 
under conditions of incompatible moral demands. The main result of this current project 
is that it is the second option, that is, by rejecting explosion as a rule of inference in moral 
inquiry, which permits us to make progress in formalizing reasoning regarding obligation 
and its cognates. 
However, it is currently more common for moral theorists to reject the possibility 
of genuine moral dilemmas. In fact, it is standard practice when constructing informal 
ethical systems, for philosophers to try to provide theoretical mechanisms to reconcile all 
apparent moral conflicts; and these mechanisms seemingly entail that any putative moral 
dilemma is in fact resolvable and thus not a genuine moral dilemma at all.  
Therefore, many philosophers seemingly hold that an essential element of a 
‘good’ ethical theory is that it can show that there is always one obligation which can 
trump or over-ride other obligations when a conflict seemingly arises. For some, a good 
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informal theory ought to provide a rigid hierarchy of obligations; other theorists argue 
that good theories ought to provide a moral calculus; and some may believe that the use 
of ‘intuition pumps’ and thought experiments, even if in a somewhat ad hoc manner, will 
result in the best model of how one obligation should trump another obligation.  
These methods are understood by their respective proponents as a necessary 
feature of their theories, in virtue of the requirement that informal moral theories be 
action-guiding. This ‘action-guiding’ criterion is often justified by the claim that it is this 
very feature which makes a theory a viable candidate for a good moral theory: it must 
always let an agent know which obligation is genuinely binding over other seemingly 
conflicting obligations. It is often said, and correctly so, that ‘action-guiding’ and ‘taking 
genuine moral dilemmas seriously’ are incompatible criteria for any informal moral 
theory. 
It is the incompatibility of ‘being action-guiding’ in this very strong sense and 
‘taking genuine moral dilemmas seriously’, together with the above-mentioned fact of 
moral experience (that there are genuine moral dilemmas) which lead me to deduce that 
there are limits to the guiding power of moral reasoning and theories. Thus, I propose that 
the present work be understood in part as a critique of moral reasoning: we will discover 
and explicate the limits of the deliverances of moral judgment, inquiry and theories.  
The Standard Deontic Logic 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the most commonly accepted 
logic used to formalize moral reasoning, Standard Deontic Logic (SDL), does not deserve 
to be considered a good formalization. In what follows, I will offer a sketch of SDL and 
its deficiencies as a formalization of moral reasoning. The main reasons for rejecting 
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SDL is its inability to express statements regarding reasoning from an incompatible set of 
obligations and the trouble SDL has in expressing how trumping reasoning can work at 
all. A further reason to reject SDL is that it validates the deduction of an ‘ought’ from an 
‘is’. I propose that it is likely inappropriate to use a formal system to characterize valid 
moral reasoning, if that system contains a valid formula which may be interpreted as 
justifying the naturalistic fallacy.  
It seems initially plausible to equate moral obligation with quantifying over 
morally accessible possible worlds: obligation is understood as moral necessity as it 
were. When we say that a possible world is morally accessible from another world we 
mean that the possible world is morally ideal from the perspective of the world to which 
it is accessible. Thus, we may infer from the recognition of an obligation in our world, 
that in every world morally accessible from ours, the course of action prescribed by the 
obligation is true of that world2. The inference is correct from right to left as well. Thus, 
given that some proposition holds in every relevant world morally accessible from ours, 
we may infer that there is an obligation to make that proposition obtain in our world. 
Moreover, many theorists propose that, given an obligation, there must always be 
at least one relevant world morally accessible from ours. Therefore, not only is there at 
least one morally relevant possible world in which all obligations in our world are there 
satisfied, but in every morally relevant possible world, every obligation we could incur in 
our world, is in fact there satisfied. Given the traditional notion that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, 
where ‘can’ is understood as requiring more than mere logical or physical possibility, 
morally relevant possible worlds must be realistically accessible through human means. 
Thus not only is there a possible world in which all our obligations are fulfilled, but 
                                                 
2 I.e. is true of us, or our counterpart, in that world etc 
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according to traditional notions of morality, this possible world is similar enough to ours 
that we could transform our world into it through human means.  
In order to provide a heuristic device as an aid in understanding why the checking 
of other worlds may help us in analyzing obligation in our world, consider the following: 
Suppose that there is a set of worlds, that includes all worlds that are morally ideal or 
desirable relative to our actual world, but where each member of this set is still 
sufficiently similar to our world that it is ‘achievable’ in a suitable sense.  
Thus if something is true of at least one of these worlds, then it seems that it must 
at least be morally permissible for us to make it true in our world. For obligation, suppose 
that there is no world, morally ideal but still sufficiently similar to our world, in which P 
holds. Then we would not be permitted to make P true, and if P is impermissible than ~P 
is obligatory3.  
The use of possible world semantics, as in the above heuristic device, has led 
some theorists to investigate the applicability of a Kripke-style semantics to moral 
reasoning. To introduce the standard system of representing moral reasoning, SDL, we 
need the following definition of a frame in a Kripke-style semantics: 
Definition 1.0 For our current purposes, a frame is a pair <W, R>, where W is a non-
empty set of worlds and R is a dyadic accessibility relation on W. So if xRy, we interpret 
this as saying that world y is accessible from world x. 
This notion of a frame may then be used to sketch out what sort of formulas we 
would want to be valid for moral reasoning.  
                                                 
3 This heuristic device relies on the law of excluded middle and De Morgan negation; if this is problematic, 
imagine that P holds in every morally desirable world sufficiently similar to the actual world. An argument 
by analogy may then indicate that a moral agent must make P true of this world on pain of inconsistency.  
 5
 
As noted above, real world obligation is characterized by many theorists as 
implying that in every world morally accessible from ours, the course of action 
prescribed by the obligation is true of that world. Thus, if in our world (call it world-x for 
now) there is an obligation to do A, then for any world y, if xRy, A holds at that world y. 
Moreover, the inference holds for the argument right to left as well. We will use the 
obvious notation P (at x) to represent: P obtains at any w, if xRw; and ◊P (at x) to 
represent: there is at least one w such that xRw and that P holds at w. 
Also, many theorists believe as a conceptual truth, that if anything is obligatory, 
then it must also be permissible. Recall also that P is permissible if, and only if, P is the 
case in at least one world morally accessible from ours; thus if there is an obligation in 
our world, there must always be at least one relevant world morally accessible from ours.  
Thus the relation R is understood as being serial:  
Definition 1.1 A relation R is serial iff for any w, there is an x, such that wRx.  
This means that if at x there is an obligation to do A, one is always entitled to infer that 
there is at least one world morally accessible from x, that is some world y, at which A 
holds. Thus, given the above characterization, if P at x then ◊P at x also.  
Consequently, it seems that those who would find the above explication of moral 
reasoning satisfying thus far may also be committed to arguing that it is only those 
formulas valid in serial frames which have a chance at being parts of a good 
formalization of moral reasoning. To make the converse inference—that all formulas 
valid in such frames are parts of such a formalization—is probably somewhat hasty. As 
noted earlier, many philosophers believe that ‘ought’ not only implies ‘permissible’ but 
also ‘can’.  
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Thus, we may need more than one accessibility relation R for our Kripke frames, 
in order to represent both alethic necessity and possibility and moral obligation and 
permissibility within the same set W of worlds. Letting R° represent the serial relation, 
and R² represent the alethic relation, we assume (as is usually done) that R² is reflexive, 
transitive, and symmetric. 
Definition 1.2 A relation R on W is reflexive, when for any w, wRw;  
Definition 1.3 A relation R on W is transitive, when for any x, y, z if xRy & yRz then xRz.  
Definition 1.4 A relation R on W is symmetric when for any w, x if wRx then xRw.  
R² is none other than the accessibility relation for the class of frames for the familiar 
modal logic S5. 
The normal modal logic KD is the class of formulas valid in serial frames. But 
since SDL also validates the inference from ‘ought’ to ‘can’, KD is not sufficient. 
Therefore, philosophers who equate moral obligation with moral necessity (classically 
understood) may find a polymodal logic with KD and S5 as a good candidate for 
formalizing moral reasoning; and indeed many have formalized SDL with the axioms of 
a polymodal logic combining KD and S5. Thus it must seem, at least initially, plausible 
that by using an appropriate interpretation, one may then use KD together with S5 to 
express or prove any sentence involved in reasoning about obligation and its cognates.  
KD is the smallest modal logic which contains every instance of the schemas 
   (P → Q) → (P→Q)         (K) 
   P → ◊P                                  (D) 
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That is, with a language of classical propositional logic with the standard set of 
propositional variables, the operators ~, →, to which we add two new unary operators, , 
and ◊, KD may be axiomatized thusly: 
A1.  All classical tautologies of the language are axioms. 
For any sentences P and Q, the following are valid:  
A2. (P→Q)→(P→Q)                            (K-schema) 
A3. P→◊P     (D-schema) 
R1. ├ P, ├ P→Q then ├ Q   (Modus Ponens) 
R2. ├ P then ├ P    (necessity closure) 
 
The D-schema formalizes the principle that “whatever is obligatory is permissible”. 
Semantically, it is the requirement that the relation R be serial that underwrites the D-
schema.  
Proposition 1.0 Let F = <W, R> be a frame. Then R is serial if, and only if, P → ◊P is 
valid in F.  
For the proof of prop 1.0, I will introduce the following definition of a propositional 
modal Model: 
Definition 1.5 A modal propositional model is an ordered triple M = <W, R, I>, where 
1. <W, R> is a frame 
2. I is a function which assigns, to any pair consisting of a world from W and a 




We can thus characterize the valid formulas to be those formulas which are true at all 
worlds under all interpretations. Given a frame, F = <W, R>, M = <W, R, I> is called a 
model based on F. Therefore, when supplied with a model based on F, we then have a 
structure which provides truth values for all atomic statements at each world in F. We 
extend the interpretation to all formulas as follows: 
Definition 1.6 P is true at w in model M, i.e., for world w, M ╞w P when, 
1. If P is atomic, M ╞w P iff I <w, P> = true, i.e., P is a member of w. 
2. M ╞w P → Q iff, if M ╞w P then M ╞w Q, i.e., M w╞ P or M ╞w Q 
3. M ╞w ~P iff, M w╞ P  
4. M ╞w P iff for any x Є W, if wRx then M ╞x P 
5. M ╞w ◊P iff there is a x Є W such that wRx and M╞x P 
Proof of Prop 1.0: Given a serial F, suppose that M ╞w P. Thus, there is an x such that 
wRx and M╞x P. Consequently, M ╞w ◊P, as desired. From right to left, assume that P 
→ ◊P is a valid formula in F. However, assume that there is no x such that wRx; then 
trivially P is true at every x accessible from w, so M ╞w P but not M ╞w ◊P, 
contradicting our supposition.                                          Q.E.D. 
 We define °, ◊°, ² and ◊² thusly: 
Definition 1.7 ‘M╞w °A’ is true iff it is true that for any x, if wR°x then M╞x A. 
Definition 1.8 ‘M╞w ◊°A’ is true iff it is true that there is at least one x, such that wR°x 
and M╞x A. 
Definition 1.9 ‘M╞w ²A’ is true iff it is true that for any x, if wR²x then M╞x A. 




As noted earlier, it is the seriality of the accessibility relation R° which is seen as 
the required property of a good formalization of equating moral necessity with the 
quantification over morally relevant localities.  
However, in order to validate the inference from ‘obligation’ to ‘can’ with a 
polymodal logic combing KD and S5, the two R-relations must be related to each other as 
follows:  
Proposition 1.1 The class of bi-modal frames <W, R°, R²> must be such as to provide a 
non-empty W, R° being a serial relation on W, R² being an equivalence (i.e., reflexive, 
transitive, and symmetric) relation on W, and for any y, if wR°y then wR²y. This condition 
results in the following formulas being valid in such a frame: °P → ◊²P; ◊° P → ◊²P. 
The former formula may be seen to represent the claim that ‘an obligation can always be 
discharged’, while the latter formula may be seen to represent the claim ‘that which is 
permitted is always possible’.  
Proof of Prop 1.1: Suppose that at a world x, °A holds. As noted above, for any w, if 
xR°w then xR²w; and since for any w, such that xR°w, then w╞A. Thus, for at least one w, 
such that xR²w, w╞ A. Therefore x├ ◊²A, as desired. Conversely, suppose that °A → 
◊²A is valid in the frame and that w is a world in the frame for which there is no x, such 
that wR²x but that x is nonetheless wR°x and for any x, x╞ A. Thus we have w╞°A but 
not w╞◊²A contradicting our supposition. For ◊°A→◊²A: Suppose that M╞x ◊°A. By 
definition of ◊°, there is a y, xR°y and M╞y A. According to the rules governing R°, R² 
interaction, for any y, if wR°y then wR²y; thus this y is xR²y. Since this y M╞y A, then we 
have M╞x ◊²A as desired. Conversely, suppose that ◊°A → ◊²A is valid in the frame and 
that w is a world in the frame for which there is no x, such that wR²x but that x is 
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nonetheless wR°x and x╞A. Thus we have w╞ ◊°A but not w╞◊²A, contrary to our 
supposition. 
SDL and Genuine Moral Dilemmas 
As an example of an advocate for equating moral obligation with moral necessity 
(classically understood), Terrance McConnell proposes that the conjunction of the 
following three sentences express an inconsistent set of propositions: (1) there are 
genuine moral dilemmas; (2) ought implies can; (3) if one is obligated to do each of two 
courses of action, then one is obligated to do both courses of action. McConnell uses the 
following argument, in his own multi-modal take on standard deontic logic (SDL), to 
show that the above set of sentences is inconsistent. In his version of SDL, OA stands for 
“it is obligatory that A” and ◊ stands for classical alethic possibility. 
1) OA     premise 
2) OB    premise 
3) ~ ◊ (A & B)   premise (1-3 represent a moral dilemma) 
4) O(A & B) → ◊ (A & B) premise; by way of (2) 
5) (OA & OB) → O(A& B) premise; by way of (3) 
6) O(A&B)   1,2,5 &I, →E 
7) ~ O (A&B)   3,4 m.t.  
McConnell goes on to argue that the fault for this inconsistency lies with the assumption 
that there can be genuine moral dilemmas. His argument mostly rests on the notion that 
the formulas in #4 and #5 in the argument above are axioms of standard deontic logic. 
Thus he suggests that the following formula in deontic/alethic polymodal logic may be 
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interpreted to represent a “condition of adequacy for any ethical theory [to] not allow for 
genuine moral dilemmas”:  
 (OA & OB) → ◊(A & B) 
I understand McConnell as arguing that ~ [(°A & °B) & ~ ◊ ²(A & B)] is a valid 
formula of a formal system, which when appropriately interpreted using deontic and 
alethic terms, expresses the proposition that there are no genuine moral dilemmas.  
However, recall from earlier that we needed to introduce a semantic postulate in 
order to characterize the appropriate class of bi-modal frames <W, R°, R²>. Such frames 
must be such as to provide a non-empty W, R° being a serial relation on W, R² being an 
equivalence (i.e., reflexive, transitive, and symmetric) relation on W, and for any y, if 
wR°y then wR²y. We previously saw that this condition results in the following classically 
desirable formulas being valid in such a class of frames: °P → ◊²P; ◊° P → ◊²P. While 
these formulas are desirable for classical theorists, the above semantic postulate also 
makes valid: ²P → °P, which may be seen to represent the somewhat intuitively odd 
claim, that if something is necessarily true, then it is morally obligatory for it to be true. 
Moreover, this claim may, arguably, be seen as a version of the naturalistic fallacy: 
deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, albeit a ‘necessary is’. 
Proof: Suppose that x╞I ²P. Thus, we have that for any y such that xR²y, then y╞I P. 
Suppose also that x╞I ~°P. Therefore there is a y, such that xR°y and y╞I ~P. And with 
our semantic postulate, this leads to contradiction. 
Such a result may indicate to some theorists that SDL, in the formalization 
provided by the polymodal KD and S5, is too strong to be a good formalization of deontic 
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reasoning. But for all we have shown so far, perhaps the impossibility of a formalization 
of genuine moral dilemmas resides in this interaction of R° and R². 




4)  ~(A & ~A) 
Proof 1): Assume x╞~[(A&B)→◊(A&B)]. Thus, x╞ (A&B) & ~◊(A&B). We have 
x╞ ~◊(A&B) by &e, and thus infer that x╞ ~(A&B) by -◊ interchange. The D-schema 
gets us x╞ ◊~(A&B). Thus there is a y such that xRy and y╞ ~(A&B). Since x╞ (A&B), 
we also infer that y╞ (A&B) holds as well, which results in contradiction. 
Proof 2): Assume x╞ ~[(A&B)→(A&B)]. So: x╞ (A&B)&~(A&B). We have 
x╞ A, x╞ B from two applications of &E. From interchange on x╞ ~(A&B), we 
infer x╞ ◊~(A&B). Thus there is a y such that xRy and y╞ ~(A&B). From x╞ A, x╞ B 
infer y╞ A and that y╞ B and therefore that y╞ A&B, which leads to contradiction. 
Proof 3): Assume that x╞ ~[◊(A&B)→(◊A&◊B)]. So: x╞ ◊(A&B)&~(◊A&◊B). By &E, 
x╞ ~(◊A&◊B). Thus we have either x╞ ~◊A or we have x╞ ~◊B. Thus we may suppose 
either x╞ ~A holds or that x╞ ~B holds, by interchange of ~◊. We have x╞ ◊(A&B) 
by &E, as above. Therefore there is a y such that xRy and y╞ A&B. But from either case, 
x╞ ~A or x╞ ~B, we now end up in contradiction at y. 
Proof 4): Suppose that x╞ A & ~A. Then we have x╞ A, by &E. The D-schema 
nets us x╞ ◊A. Therefore there is a y such that xRy and y╞ A. Since we also have x╞~A 
by &E we infer that at any y such that xRy then y╞ ~A, which leads to contradiction. 
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And of course, given the classical definition of negation, we can’t both have an 
obligation to do A and not have an obligation to do A in KD. 
Therefore we have: 
Proposition 1.2 Genuine moral dilemmas are still impossible according to KD—that is, if 
A and B are logically incompatible then (A & B) is unsatisfiable: 
Proof of Prop 1.2:  ~(P & ~P) is valid in KD, as shown in proof 4 above. 
~(P & ~P) is valid in KD, by definition of negation. 
If ‘A; B╞ f’’, where f represents any contradiction, is true, then ~(A & B) is verified 
by any model in KD: Let us suppose that ‘A; B╞ f’’ is true in a model. Let us also 
suppose that x╞ A and x╞ B and therefore that∀ y, if xRy then y╞ A, and y╞ B. By 
seriality, there is a w such that xRw. So: there is a w such that w╞ A & B, which 
according to our assumption, is impossible.  
  
Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) and its affiliates cannot represent genuine moral 
dilemmas. In fact, some proponents of SDL explicitly argue that SDL is incompatible 
with genuine moral dilemmas. As we have seen, they are right about this. However, how 
is it possible for proponents of such logics to reasonably reconcile this fact with the fact 
that moral agents all too frequently find themselves, at least on first sight, in positions of 
conflicting obligations? I propose it is impossible for proponents of SDL to reasonably 
reconcile its no-dilemmas feature with moral experience, unless they cherry-pick what 
counts as genuine elements of moral experience.  
The advocate of SDL may object to the charge of cherry-picking, by claiming 
that, of whatever sets of obligations populate the ethical domain, it is true that it is 
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impossible for them to be inconsistent. However, let us press on, and see whether this 
claim is at all plausible after considering only one type of obligation: promise-making. 
Consider how few theorists will argue that someone, either through his or her own 
wrongdoing or ignorance, could not make incompatible promises. For example, consider 
Jack who, knowing that he can’t be in two places at the same time, nonetheless promises 
Felicity that he will meet her in London at 3pm and promises Vera that he will meet her 
in Toronto at 3pm that same day. Therefore, if keeping promises are obligatory, as is 
commonly assumed, there is at least one class of self-inconsistent sets of obligations, 
contrary to the initial claim of SDL proponents. 
Nevertheless, proponents of SDL and most informal theorists may see fit to revise 
the above claim. They may argue that SDL proves that it is only obligations incurred 
without your own wrong-doing or ignorance so corrupting the situation, which are always 
consistent. This is exactly the type of cherry-picking that SDL requires to defend it. SDL 
requires postulating that some sets of moral obligations are somehow outside the domain 
of ethical discourse. Unless there is independent support for such a postulate, SDL 
deserves to be seen as cherry-picking the characteristics of appropriate moral inquiry. 
Until such independent support can be procured, it seems reasonable to require that a 
good formalization of deontic logic should not preclude an inconsistent set of obligations 
from being a part of an appropriate moral inquiry.  
To add insult to injury, consider that it is not always your own wrongdoing or 
ignorance which may be responsible for you making incompatible promises or incurring 
incompatible obligations. Let us thus suppose that Ronald, who happens to be a very bad 
person, tells Jack that St. Mary’s Church is located on the corner of 12th street and Jester 
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Avenue, which it isn’t. Jack then, in good faith, promises Felicity to meet her at St. 
Mary’s Church at 3pm and promises Vera to meet her on the corner of 12th street and 
Jester Avenue at 3pm, believing that he can discharge both obligations as incurred. Now, 
it doesn’t seem correct to insist that Jack is to blame for the incompatible character of his 
obligations, but rather it is the evil Ronald who is to blame, since he lied to Jack about the 
location of the church.  
If we then argue that Ronald’s behavior doesn’t likewise cause any trouble for 
those informal theories wedded to the claim that all of Jack’s ‘normal’ sets of obligations 
may be realized, it seems that we may be merely begging the question: we recognize an 
acceptable (i.e., ‘normal’) set of obligations only if the set may be coherently or jointly 
realized. Again we are merely cherry-picking what counts as genuine moral experience in 
order to make the SDL characterization of consequence fit moral inquiry.  
Some may object that it is still Jack’s own ignorance of the true location of the 
church which is truly responsible for the incompatibility of his obligations; or perhaps 
Jack did wrong in trusting Ronald’s regarding the whereabouts of the church. Even if 
these objections get it right, consider how many real obligations could be incurred under 
the ideal conditions of always knowing who to trust and always knowing whether 
responsibilities we choose to undertake will be jointly realizable.  
To make the implicit principle to which I am appealing explicit, consider the 
following analogy to the principle of epistemic humility: in similar fashion to how 
humans are epistemically fallible, and thus no one can reasonably think that every belief 
he or she has is true, humans are morally fallible, and inevitably so. Therefore, no matter 
how careful we are, we can never be sure that we or others like us haven’t done or will do 
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something morally wrong or that we are not ignorant of some morally relevant feature, 
which may in turn, render our own or others’ future set of obligations unsatisfiable.  
In virtue of this similarity to epistemic humility, I will call this principle the 
Principle of Deontic Humility. Together with epistemic humility, the truth of deontic 
humility renders the inference from ‘ought’ to ‘can’ untenable: we can never know that 
there is no prior wrongdoing, committed by oneself or by someone else, which precludes 
the satisfaction of any given set of obligations. Indeed, epistemic humility means that a 
reasonable person should think that any one of his or her beliefs may be false; deontic 
humility guarantees that there is ‘stuff’ we can be wrong about, namely, whether or not 
there is some prior wrongdoing which precludes the satisfaction of a given set of 
obligations. This consideration seems to imply that deontic humility is entailed by 
epistemic humility; however, I will not pursue this issue here. 
The above argument may be outlined thusly, with X representing any arbitrary 
action as long as it is possible for some wrongdoing to preclude someone from doing it4: 
1) If you ought to do X then necessarily, you can do X. 
2) If you can do X, then necessarily, there are no prior wrongdoings which precludes 
doing X. 
3) Humans inevitably fail to always do what is morally right. If there could be some 
prior wrongdoing which could preclude doing X, it is unreasonable to suppose 
that it is impossible that no one has done that wrongdoing.  
4) Therefore it is unreasonable to suppose that it is always possible that you can do 
X…thus it is not the case that for any X, it is reasonable to suppose that you ought 
to do X. 
 
Thus, unless no action which may be precluded by some wrongdoing is ever obligatory, 
we must reject either that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ or the Principle of Deontic Humility. 
Since the Principle of Deontic Humility is grounded in ordinary moral experience and 
                                                 
4 Otherwise, the claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ would seem rather mundane. 
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common-sense, rejecting the Principle of Deontic Humility comes at a far higher cost 
than does rejecting idealized conceptions of morality which always permit the inference 
from ‘ought’ to ‘can’.  
Therefore, I propose that the class of such classes of obligations which, in virtue 
of certain conceptual truths regarding obligation and its cognates, are necessarily 
compatible and jointly realizable will likely be quite small, perhaps even empty5. In other 
words, such conceptions may well be inapplicable to our world of experience: they fail to 
accurately describe the features that are part of the actual world because these theories 
contravene the Principle of Deontic Humility. 
Secondly, I propose that genuine moral dilemmas deserve to be treated, prima 
facie, as elements in moral agents’ lives. The experiences of impossible moral situations, 
in which the values justifying incompatible prescriptions are incommensurable, are a 
mainstay in literature and cultural products, from the sublime in Sartre to the low-brow 
and juvenile in comic-book heroes. I propose that the apparent success of such cultural 
products is due to the resonance most consumers experience when they consider the 
moral quandary in which the protagonists find themselves confined6. Moreover, it is 
unfortunately far too easy to imagine that cases even worse than Searle’s choice occur too 
often in our world. 
My argument is conductive in nature; however I believe it permits one to 
reasonably believe, contrary to the claims of SDL’s proponents, that moral agents can 
                                                 
5 Consider the implications that the belief in a devil might have on this line of reasoning: that it is likely 
that all or nearly all our obligations we might incur will have historical roots in the activities of an evil 
agent much worse than our evil Ronald. For those who argue for the no-dilemmas position for theological 
reasons, it might well behoove them to reconsider the appropriateness of such a position if their ontology 
includes such evil forces. 
6 Furthermore, in the case of comic book heroes, it is only in virtue of their super-powers that they are able 
to reconcile what would be for the rest of us, incompatible obligations. 
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and do experience and reason from genuine moral dilemmas. The belief that all sets of 
obligations are compatible and jointly realizable is, I propose, a matter of faith in the 
applicability of certain conceptual truths to our world of experience. Contrarily, the 
complexity and diversity of our moral lives, together with the nearly common, shared 
experience of moral dilemmas, provides a prima facie case against the appropriateness of 
conceiving obligation in the manner proposed by advocates of SDL and its affiliate 
informal ethical theories. 
KD and its Affiliates Tackle Trumping 
With the D-schema, we infer from x╞ A that x╞ ~~A. However, when we say 
that another obligation, let’s say B, trumps A, we say that it is now impermissible to 
do A if doing A precludes also doing B. Therefore, adding new premises changes what 
could be originally inferred from x╞ A, namely that x╞ ◊A. Thus, at least at first blush, 
monotonic logics cannot provide an adequate formalization of moral theories which 
contain principles permitting one obligation to trump another obligation.  
SDL and KD are types of monotonic logic. For at each locality (i.e., accessible 
worlds), truth-functional formulas are given truth-values using classical truth tables7. 
And the truth-functional formulas of classical logic are widely known to be monoto
Furthermore, recall that in KD, we know that for any x in any interpretation if x╞ A  
then x╞ ◊A. Let us suppose that x╞ A. Thus we infer x╞ ◊A. We show that in KD for 
any x, if x╞ A and x╞ B then x╞◊A also. Suppose now that not only x╞ A but that 
x╞ B also. Nonetheless, for any x in any interpretation if x╞ A then x╞ ◊A, thus we 
have x╞ ◊A regardless of the addition of any further premises. 
nic. 
                                                 
7 This is a sufficient condition for monotonicity, given that the R accessibility relation is the same for any 
arbitrary x and w such that wRx. 
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Consequently, the inference that if x╞ P then x╞ Q therefore if x╞ P & R then 
x╞Q is thus valid for any x in any interpretation according to KD and its affiliates. Thus, 
adding new premises cannot change what was previously implied by the original set of 
premises in KD. This feature of KD, I argue, renders it inappropriate to be applied to 
moral reasoning. By ‘trumping’ we mean specifically a type of reasoning, which by 
introducing new premises, changes what was previously implied by the original set of 
premises. 
Not only does KD fail to be non-monotonic, I will show in what follows that KD, 
when interpreted using moral terms, can not express the notion of a hierarchy of sets of 
obligations taking part in an appropriate moral inquiry. Informally, trumping-like 
reasoning only makes sense when we must know which member(s) of an inconsistent set 
of obligations over-rides the others. KD explosively infers that anything and nothing is 
obligatory from an inconsistent set of obligations: Obligation Explosion. If this holds for 
KD, then it likewise must hold for a multimodal KD and S5: SDL and its affiliates. 
Therefore SDL cannot represent trumping-like reasoning. 
We now turn to formally investigating whether KD is capable of representing how 
one obligation can over-ride another obligation. To do so, we introduce a new operator <, 
a binary relation on sets of obligations: we shall write x╞ P<Q, for the situation such that 
whenever an obligation from type Q comes into conflict with an obligation from type P, 
the obligation from type Q should have more weight in moral reasoning than obligations 
from P, or alternatively, that Q-type obligations trump P-type obligations. Hierarchies 
then can be understood as containing a possibly partial ordering of sets of obligations 
given by <. 
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Proposition 1.3 KD and any of its affiliates cannot, without explosively proving that 
everything and nothing is obligatory, represent moral reasoning from P; Q╞ f together 
with a hierarchy, which returns with a desirable result: for example provided that          
x╞ Q<P, if x╞ Q and x╞ P then x╞ ~Q & P & ◊P & ◊~Q. 
To prove this, we define a hierarchy: 
Definition 1.11 A hierarchy h is here stipulated as a function on sets of obligations. Each 
set is self-consistent, i.e. contains only jointly realizable obligations. At point x,  h: for 
any A, B such that [((A & B) but A; B╞ f) & for some P, Q (((A∈P & B∈Q) v 
(A∈Q & B∈P)) & ~((A P & B∈ ∈P) v (A∈Q & B∈Q))) & (P<Q v Q<P & 
~(P<Q & Q<P)8)]→ [((Q<P & & A∈P) → ~B) v ((Q<P & B∈P) →~A) v ((P<Q 
& & A∈Q) → ~B) v ((P<Q & B∈Q) →~A)].  
Proof of Prop 1.3: Assume x╞ A. Introduce new premise x╞ B, but that A; B╞ f. 
Suppose that B belongs to P & A belongs to Q and a hierarchy assigns Q<P. Then we 
infer x╞ ~A using the hierarchy function. Since KD├ ~(A & ~A), if  x╞ A, x╞ 
~A v C, for some arbitrary C, then by disjunctive syllogism, we may infer that 
anything and nothing is obligatory or permissible.  
 Even without the above characterization of a hierarchy, any informal trumping-
like reasoning along the lines of: 
‘suppose that x╞ P and x╞Q but that P; Q╞ f, so we need action-guiding. Our 
favorite informal theory claims that Q trumps P, therefore we must do Q at 
the expense of P’,  
…results in obligation explosion. So: 
                                                 
8 Since < is symmetrical and we are considering partial orders, then if P<Q and Q<P then P=Q. This is 
undesirable given that we want members of one set of obligations to trump other, lower ranked obligations. 
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Proposition 1.4 KD is incompatible with any trumping-like reasoning, if we do not 
desire to verify the truth of every formula. 
Proof: This can be seen straightforwardly: Suppose that P; Q╞ f, but that x╞ P and x╞ 
Q, in order to set up a situation which calls for trumping-like reasoning. However, we 
infer that for any y such that xRy, y╞ P and y╞ Q. By our assumption, P; Q╞ f, and since 
we can infer y╞ P v M from y╞ P, we infer that y╞ M, for any arbitrary M. By -
definition we have x╞ M, for any arbitrary M. 
 
There is nothing to block this result within KD unless one rejects the possibility 
that an obligation can be overridden by a later obligation. This seems to undercut the 
basis for the ‘action-guiding’ criterion of good informal theories. Thus the proponent of 
Standard Deontic Logic is incapable of using any logic sufficiently similar to KD to 
represent the sentences of his or her favorite informal ethical theories, if such theories are 
considered ‘action-guiding’ in this sense. 
Again, the valid formula of KD, ~ [(A & B) & ~ ◊(A & B)], when interpreted 
with deontic terms, with or without S5, rules out any and all incompatibility of moral 
obligations. Moreover, any hierarchical ranking of sets of obligations in which one 
obligation trumps another obligation, seen as so essential to action-guiding in informal 
ethical theories, is also excluded by this formula9. Thus, when applied to informal moral 
reasoning, KD and its affiliates should not be acceptable as a good formalization.  
With KD, in which moral obligations cannot conflict, if two demands do conflict, 
one of them could never have been an obligation in the first place, regardless of its 
                                                 




supposed moral virtues. In other words, unless the possibility that everything and nothing 
is obligatory is countenanced, nothing should be considered an obligation until it can be 
known to cause no conflict with any other higher ranked obligation we may incur. Such 
an epistemic requirement seems far too high of a cost in return for the simplicity of a 
classical formalization of deontic reasoning.  
On the other hand, perhaps all we are left with is prima facie obligations. But to 
accept that obligations generally have only prima facie status seems to come at a steep 
cost: what sense can be made of a prima facie moral necessity, classically understood? 
The notion of a prima facie moral necessity is, in classical modal logic, incoherent; thus 
treating obligations as having prima facie status only does harm to the plausibility of the 
SDL proponent’s cause. 
Making Valid the Naturalistic Fallacy 
Consider again how SDL permits the inference: 
                                                          ├ A   
                                                         ├A 
However, as Mares (2004) shows, this closure rule, together with permitting the addition 
of irrelevant premises and the deduction theorem (or →I) we can prove: 
                                                  
 
         ├ A      (hypothesis) 
                                                        ├ A     (closure under ) 
                                                       p├ A    (weakening) 
                                                       ├ p → A (→I) 
 
It seems reasonable to read ├ p → A as permitting, as a matter of logic, the inference of 
an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, when applied to deontic logic. I imagine that many philosophers 
will find it undesirable that SDL so straightforwardly makes the naturalistic fallacy valid. 
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 I propose that this result provides at least an ancillary justification, together with 
SDL’s problems with representing genuine moral dilemmas and trumping, for rejecting 
SDL as a good formalization of ethical discourse. Therefore, the following chapters will 
focus on the comparative merits using two formal, non-monotonic and para-consistent 
systems, a relevant modal logic, and a preservationist-style modal logic, in order to 





















A Relevant Deontic Logic: Considering the Impossible 
When we previously considered the fit between SDL and the set of inferences we desire 
to be valid in ethical reasoning, SDL’s failures appear to be in part due to its inclusion of 
the fallacies of irrelevance in its set of valid formulas. SDL permits explosion, which 
entails that an impossible moral situation cannot be used fruitfully in moral reasoning 
(since a contradiction implies anything). Likewise, the addition of irrelevant premises is 
permitted in SDL’s characterization of the inference relation. The validity of this fallacy 
of irrelevance in SDL causes two seemingly insurmountable problems. Firstly, we saw 
that the monotonicity of this inference relation torpedoes any attempt to formalize one 
obligation trumping another. Secondly, SDL, due to weakening and necessitation closure 
makes the naturalistic fallacy valid.  
Situations and Worlds 
In the relevant logic R (for relevant implication), the class of models capable of 
being used to characterize the class of validities will have to be more general than its 
classical counterpart: we need to increase the set of objects to quantify over in order to 
enlarge the class of counter-examples. Recall that, as shown in the previous chapter, for a 
classical frame: F = <W, R>, W is a non-empty set of possible worlds; furthermore, if 
each point in a model: M = <W, R, I> is characterized as a possible world, then according 
to any classical semantics, such possible worlds deserve to be understood as “deciding 
every issue”10. Thus, for any proposition, each point belongs either to the set of points for 
which that proposition receives the value true or to the set of points for which that 
proposition receives the value false. Likewise possible worlds are completely consistent: 
                                                 
10 Pg 27 Mare 
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for any possible world x, it is never the case that x╞  p & ~p. The indices in frame-
semantics for a relevant logic, alternatively, should be understood as being more like 
possible ‘situations’ rather than possible worlds. 
Worlds decide every issue; situations, on the other hand, may lack information 
regarding whether an arbitrary proposition is true or false. Furthermore, no possible 
world in a model can belong to a set which makes both P and ~P true, i.e., possible 
worlds are completely consistent; some situations, however, may make such 
contradictions true11. We will call situations which lack information, ‘partial situations’, 
and situations that are inconsistent, ‘inconsistent situations’; those situations that are 
complete and consistent, we will call ‘logical situations’ and those situations which are 
either partial or inconsistent (or both) are called ‘non-logical situations’.  
Logical situations have a tidy relationship with validity in a relevant logic model. 
Those formulae verified by the empty set are true at all logical worlds; this is exactly 
what we should expect: logical truths will be true at logical situations. However, there is 
no guarantee, and reasonably so, that the valid formulae of any logic will be true at the 
non-logical situations in its semantics.  
The first section in this chapter will explicate and justify using such situations in 
modeling the class of valid deontic inferences. But before so doing, I will briefly 
introduce a ternary accessibility relation R on situations, which is integral for the 
following characterization of the relevant truth condition for implication. Together with 
definitions of a persistence relation, relevant frames and models, and a semantic version 
of a deduction theorem, we will be able to set up the logical machinery for the positive 
fragment of relevant implication: R+. 




Definition 2.0 (Relevant implication) x╞ A → B in a model iff for any y and for any z 
in the model if (Rxyz & y╞ A) then z╞ B 
 
To explicate this definition, we first need to stipulate the properties of a persistence 
relation on situations, offer a semantic version of the deduction theorem, and provide 
definitions of a relevant frame and model 
Definition 2.1 A persistence relation is a binary relation on situations, such that for any 
situations t and u, u extends t iff there is at least one logical situation s, and Rstu. When u 
extends t, we say that t is a part of u; thus in order theory terminology, t ≤ u. In words, 
suppose we have a set of information due to a logical s, and that Rstu. If we were to 
hypothesize that something from situation t obtains in the same world as s, then we would 
be entitled to infer that something from situation u would also obtain in the same world. 
Thus, if Rstu, and s is logical, then I(t)⊆ I(u)  
 
In order to characterize an appropriate deduction theorem, we will need persistence to be 
a partial order: reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetrical. Furthermore, if an 
interpretation I assigns true to any proposition p at t and u extends t, then I must also 
assign true to p at u, in virtue of the part-whole relationship between these situations. 
Definition 2.2 A relevant frame is an F such that F =<sit, logical, R >, where sit is a non-
empty set of situations, logical is a non-empty subset of sit, the set of logical situations12, 
and an accessibility relation R, which possesses the following properties: 
 For any s, t, u of sit 
1. If Rstu, then Rtsu   (interchange) 
                                                 
12 That is situations which obey all the classical laws of logic…analogous to possible worlds 
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2. If Rstu, then Rsst   (repetition) 
3. Rsss                         (complete reflexivity) 
4. If Rstu and s extends s', then Rs'tu           (transitivity) 
Definition 2.3 A relevant model is an M such that M = <sit, logical, R, I> where < sit, 
logical, R> is a relevant frame and I is an interpretation which takes situations into the 
power-set of atoms, and thus assigns a situation s to I(p) if p is true at s according to I.  
Theorem 2.0 Semantic Entailment: If the relevant entailment from ‘A’ to ‘B’ is verified 
in a model then ‘A → B’ is likewise verified at all logical situations in the model. 
Moreover, if an entailment is verified in any model, then its subsequent implication is 
likewise verified at all logical situations in all models. Therefore such an implication 
would necessarily be a valid formula of the system. 
Proof: Given a model M, suppose we have formulae ‘A’ and ‘B’, an arbitrary logical 
situation s and arbitrary situations t and u, such that Rstu. Assume that for any arbitrary 
situation y, if M verifies formula ‘A’ at y, then M also verifies ‘B’ at y. Since s is a logical 
situation and Rstu, then u extends t. Let us suppose that M verifies ‘A’ at t; according to 
our assumption, M also verifies ‘B’ at t. Thus, M likewise verifies ‘B’ at u due to the 
persistence relation. Consequently, we have s╞ A → B, since for any y and for any z in 
the model if (Rsyz & y╞ A) then z ╞ B. Furthermore, according to our assumption, we 
may, for any situation, deduce B from A. Thus, at s we may deduce B from A.     Q.E.D. 
The Positive fragment13 of logic R 
With the above definitions of a relevant frame, model and a ternary accessibility 
relation, the truth conditions for formulae without negation (for →, v, &, for any 
                                                 
13 The logic of Relevant implication without negation 
 28
 
propositional variable p and formulae A and B, where ‘s╞I A’ means that A is true at s 
according to I) may be given as follows: 
1. s╞I p iff s∈I(p)  
2. s╞I A & B iff s╞I A and s╞I B 
3. s╞I A v B iff s╞I A or s╞I B14 
4. s╞I A → B iff for any x, for any y, if (Rsxy & x╞I A) then y╞I B 
A Relevant Negation 
The truth conditions for negation in classical logic, given a standard semantics, 
may be characterized as being analogous to set compliment: 
Definition 2.4 Classical negation for propositional variable p, world x and interpretation 
I:  ‘x╞I ~p’ iff x does not belong to the set of possible worlds in which p is true according 
to I. 
Classical negation for formula ‘A’, world x and interpretation I: ‘x╞I ~A’ iff ‘A’ fails to 
be true in x. 
By equating negation with the failure of points in a model to belong to the set of points in 
which the proposition or formula is true seems to entail, by all appearances15, that each 
point is complete and consistent. With models in which all points are complete and 
consistent, many of the fallacies of irrelevance may be verified, as demonstrated in many 
                                                 
14 Note that an alternative clause may be desirable for disjunction: s╞I A v B iff there is an x such that Msx 
and x╞I A or x╞I B). M is in this case an binary accessibility relation on sit; this may be read as claiming 
that there is an accessible, but (possibly) as yet not accessed, situation in which either A will be found to be 
true or B will. For example, consider that, given what we know now (call this situation s) about a well-
confirmed scientific theory, together with knowledge that with one more piece of information that is soon 
forthcoming (call this situation t), it is only a matter of time before we discover whether A is the case or B 
is the case. Thus at s, even before we receive that one more piece of information, we know that either A is 
the case or B is the case. So it is not the case that s╞I A or s╞I B, but s╞I A v B nonetheless. 
15 On the other hand, Graham Priest claims that this inference depends on the classical metalanguage 
lurking in the background, and once rejected, the ‘fails to be true’ clause does not entail complete and 
consistent points.  
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accessible primers in relevant logic. Thus, the classical semantics for negation need to be 
jettisoned for the current project. 
To define a relevant negation, consider that, unlike classical semantics, we have a 
class of impossible points. This class may be equated with the proposition expressed by 
“something impossible occurs”16 which we will call proposition f17; so that I(f) = 
impossible situations, i.e., {x x╞I P & ~P}. 
Definition 2.5 Relevant negation: 
 ‘s╞I ~A’ is true iff for any x and for any y, (Rsxy & x╞I A)→ y╞I f. 
This definition, with a model M = <sit, logical, f, R, I>, where f as defined above, is a 
subset of sit, gives us negation in terms of a relevant implication of an impossible 
situation being realized: ~A = A → f. Furthermore, we can now define both an 
incompatibility and compatibility relation between situations. 
Definition 2.6 With a model M = <sit, logical, R, N, I> an incompatibility relation N is a 
binary relation on sit such that Nst iff for any x if Rstx then x╞ f 
Note that a situation may be incompatible with itself. For example if t╞I A & ~A, then 
Ntt. 
Definition 2.7 With a model M = <sit, logical, R, C, I> a compatibility relation C is a 
binary relation on sit such that Cst iff for any x if Rstx then it is not the case that x╞ f 
We now have two more ways of formalizing negation, in terms of a compatibility 
relation or an incompatibility relation: 
Definition 2.8 Negation in terms of incompatibility:  
 ‘s ╞ ~A’ iff for any x if x╞ A then Nsx 
                                                 
16 Pg 81 Mare 
17 I am assuming a non-dialethetist para-consistency framework… 
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Definition 2.9 Negation in terms of compatibility: 
 ‘s╞ ~A’ iff for any x if Csx then it is not the case that x╞ A 
We will follow Mares (2004) in primarily using the compatibility relation to define a 
relevant negation. Since we have inconsistent situations, this precludes the compatibility 
relation from being reflexive. However in relevant logic, A → ~~A is a rule in its natural 
deduction system. This requires that the compatibility relation be symmetrical, that is if 
Cst then Cts. This shouldn’t be surprising considering that the structural rule of weak 
commutativity (X;Y ├ Y;X) is included in the relevant sequent calculus. 
A Short Tangent: An additional negation operator 
Symmetrical compatibility will lead us astray in formalizing deontic logic, as we 
will discover later in this chapter. Thus, we will briefly investigate how we may introduce 
an additional negation operator by rejecting both versions of commutativity and 
introducing a right to left conditional operator. Recall that in the sequent calculus where 
A, B and X are structures and ‘;’ is our punctuation we have our left to right arrow 
introduction rule18 (→I): 
                                            X; A├ B 
                                            X├ A→ B 
For a right to left arrow introduction rule (←I) we have: 
                                            A; X├ B 
                                            X├ B ← A 
With weak commutativity19, → and ← are equivalent. However, to achieve a good 
formalization of reasoning about obligation and its cognates, I propose that we need to 
have both arrows. Briefly and informally, the need for both arrows in this domain is due 
                                                 
18 Which is predicated upon our semantic entailment version of the deduction theorem 
19Among other substructural logics, there are other ways of making → and ← equivalent. For example, if 
we have 0 as a zero-place punctuation mark for the empty-set, we achieve the same result with 
commutativity and the push and pop rules. 
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to how we seem to be most concerned about obligations regarding actions. And reasoning 
about actions appears to require both arrows, especially when reasoning about one action 
precluding another action: one action may be incompatible with the other, but not the 
other way around. For example, Restall appeals to the pair <giving all your money away, 
buying a sports car>, which we will symbolize as M and C respectively. This pair of 
actions is jointly incompatible, but in only one direction: 
    M; C├ f 
                                                M├ C → f 
The above sequent, together with our definition of ‘~’ negation, provides us with M├ ~C; 
but it seems undesirable to be able to prove C├ ~M from M├ ~C in this case. However, 
with weak commutativity it is so provable: 
M├ ~C                      (hypothesis) 
                                                M; C├ f                     (by ~ definition and →e) 
                                                C; M├ f                     (weak communtativity) 
    C├ M→ f                  (→I) 
In words, giving away all my money precludes then buying a sports car. But buying a 
sports car should not preclude then giving away all my money (even if all that’s left over 
is the change in the sofa). Therefore, by rejecting commutativity and by including the 
right to left arrow, we obtain a different inference to f: 
                                                 M; C├ f 
                                                 C├ f ← M 
We may then use f ← A to define a distinct negation: 
Definition 2.10 ¬ negation: 
                         ¬A = f ← A          
Thus we may interpret M├ ~C as claiming that giving all your money away 
precludes you from also buying a car. We may interpret C├ ¬M as claiming that you 
buy a sports car, given that you didn’t first give all your money away. In relevant logic 
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the order of the premises doesn’t normally matter, but in order to formalize reasoning 
regarding actions, the order of the actions appears to be relevant. Since ethical reasoning 
is for the most part concerned about obligations regarding actions, it is likely that the 
order of premises is relevant for characterizing the appropriate inference relation of 
deontic logic. Moreover, in the same manner that one action may preclude the other, but 
not vice versa, we may need the same sort of structural rules to deal with one obligation 
trumping another, since trumping should not, likewise, be a symmetrical relation. 
                           Negation and Partial and Inconsistent Situations 
The relevant ‘~’ negation as outlined above, as defined by the compatibility 
relation, indicates constraints on the properties that the points in our models may possess. 
Consider a situation s, for example the situation that “consists of the information that is 
currently available to me…[n]othing happening here makes it true that it is currently 
raining … on the other side of the globe. But situations in which it is raining [on the other 
side of the globe] are compatible with my current situation. So neither ‘It is raining [on 
the other side of the globe]’ nor ‘It is not raining [on the other side of the globe]’ is true 
in my current situation.”20 Therefore neither R (for raining etc) nor ~R is true of situation 
s. The situation s is thus partial. 
Likewise, consider another situation s, which is someone’s representation of a 
part of the world. Situation s however represents its corresponding part of the world in 
incompatible ways. Situations like s would then be incompatible with themselves. Mares 
argues that “[w]hen a situation s is incompatible with itself, it is possible for it to make a 
formula A true, but A fail to be true in every situation compatible with s.”21  
                                                 
20 Pg 75 Mares 
21 Pg 76 ibid 
 33
 
So: s belongs to I(A) but for any x if Csx then it is not the case that x╞ A. Therefore s╞I 
A & ~A. 
Box and Diamond Operators for R 
Since in this chapter we have used R to characterize the accessibility relation for 
implication, I will use M for a modal accessibility relation, to avoid confusion. We can 
use a familiar take on standard kripkean semantics to define our box and diamond 
operators: 
Definition 2.11 A relevant : 
                        ‘s╞I A’ iff ∀ x, if Msx then x╞I A 
Definition 2.12 A relevant ◊: 
                         ‘s╞I ◊A’ iff x such that Msx & x╞I A∃ 22 
Given an application of these modal operators to deontic logic, we have a revised, but 
familiar, interpretation of ought and permitted:  
it is true that ‘A is obligatory’ in a situation s, if and only if, A is true at     
every morally ideal situation accessible from s. 
 
it is true that ‘A is permitted’ in a situation s, if and only if, A is true in at 
least one morally ideal situation accessible from s. 
Moreover, we will need the D axiom ‘A → ◊A’ as an axiom in relevant deontic logic, 
much like in standard deontic logic. The semantic postulate corresponding to this axiom 
                                                 
22 Note that with commutativity, symmetrical compatibility, and with a postulate regarding the existence of 
a maximal consistent situation x for every situation s, such that Csx, and for any y if Csy then x extends y, 
we then have double negation elimination (dne) as a rule, which allows us to instead define ◊ as ~~. 
However, I happen to be attracted to the adoption of an intuitionistic version of negation, since the semantic 
postulates in relevant logic required for dne are cumbersome and require too much faith in the appeal of 
dne as a good inference. 
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is again identical to the one in SDL: that for any s there is an x such that Msx. It seems 
inappropriate to justify an obligation to ‘A’ due to ‘A’ being true at all morally accessible 
situations, just because there are no accessible situations. 
Taking Genuine Moral Dilemmas Seriously 
With the logic R for relevant modal implication, impossible moral situations can 
take a fruitful part in reasoning about obligation and its cognates. Recall that by a 
‘genuine moral dilemma’, we refer to situations in which incompatible moral demands 
confront a moral agent, without any reason to select one obligation as having more 
weight or authority than the other. By ‘fruitful’, I mean that valid reasoning from an 
inconsistent set of premises does not remove all constraints on what can be inferred from 
that set of premises. If it is possible to fruitfully reason from an inconsistent set of 
premises then I argue that such a type of reasoning deserves to be considered as taking 
genuine moral dilemmas seriously. 
Theorem 2.1 R does not remove all constraints on what can be inferred from an 
impossible moral situation of type ‘A & ~A’:  
The inference P & ~P therefore B; for arbitrary B, is invalid in R 
Proof Suppose we have s╞I P & ~P, then ∀ x, if Msx then x╞I P and x╞I ~P. From 
D, we infer there is an x, such that x╞I P & ~P. By definition of ‘~’ negation, we have 
that for any y, if Cxy then it is not the case that y╞I P. However there is nothing in this 
model that forces that x╞I B v ~B, since x may be partial. Thus while ∀ x, such that Msx, 
x╞I P & ~P, we do not have x╞I B for arbitrary formula B. Furthermore, ∀ y such that 
Rsxy, there is nothing in the semantics that forces y╞I B, so (P & ~P)→ B is also not 
a valid formula of R. 
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Theorem 2.2 R does not remove all limits on what can be inferred from an impossible 
moral situation of type ‘A & ~A’:  
  The inference P & ~P therefore B; for arbitrary B, is invalid in R 
Proof Suppose we have s╞I P & ~P. Then by  definition we have that for any x if 
Msx, then x╞I P. But we also have that it is the case that not every x, such that Msx, x╞I 
P. So we have an x, in which x╞I P and x╞I ~ P. So every situation y such Cxy, y can not 
make P true. However, since x╞I P, Nxx. However, there is nothing in the semantics that 
forces x╞I B v ~B, since x may be partial. Furthermore, for any y such that Rsxy, there is 
nothing in the semantics that forces y╞I B, so we also do not have (P & ~P)→B as a 
valid formula in R. 
Theorem 2.3 R does not remove all limits on what can be inferred from an impossible 
moral situation of type ‘A; B├ f’: 
 (A & (B→ f)) → C; for arbitrary C, is invalid in R 
Proof Suppose we have an arbitrary situation s, such that Rstu & for any situation y, if 
y╞I A & B, then it is also the case that y╞I f. Let’s assume that t╞I A & B. Then 
we also have t╞I f. Since u extends t, u╞I f. Thus we have s╞I ~(A & B) and          
t╞I A & B; therefore Nst. However, there is nothing in the semantics that forces u╞I 
C since u may be a partial as well as an inconsistent situation.                                 Q.E.D. 
These counter-examples to obligation explosion in R may be then cashed out as 
the class of models which provides value assignments in which all accessible morally 





Formalizing Trumping Hierarchies 
When formalizing a trumping hierarchy for ethical reasoning, we desire a system 
that can capture the notion that even though something may be true in every accessible 
morally ideal situation, it may be over-ridden by some other proposition true in every 
accessible morally ideal situation. In SDL, we discovered we were committed to there 
only being one member of a pairwise inconsistent set being true at a time in any morally 
ideal world. As such it didn’t make sense to say that one obligation trumped another 
obligation, since obligations were defined as being true at all accessible morally ideal 
situations. And if only one of two inconsistent propositions can be true in any accessible 
morally ideal world, only one of those propositions could be seen as being obligatory, 
since at most one can be true in every such world. Given that it appears infeasible or 
undesirable to jettison from ethical theories all talk23 of one obligation over-riding 
another; it seems that SDL doesn’t deserve to be considered a good candidate for deontic 
logic. 
An appropriate formalization of trumping-like reasoning must be able to let 
obligations that are trumped by another obligation, remain obligations nonetheless, i.e., 
they would remain true at all accessible morally ideal situations. Thus the semantics of 
trumping seemingly require inconsistent points in its framework. Relevant logic happens 
to have such a framework. To formalize trumping in a hierarchy we introduce a binary 
operator < on formulae, which provides a partial ordering. Thus, if P<Q, we infer that Q 
should have more moral weight in our moral reasoning than P. 
                                                 
23 Granted that this talk takes obligations as more than merely hypotheses entered into a chain of reasoning 
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Theorem 2.4 R is compatible with the claim that, if P<Q; i.e., assuming Q; P├ f24, then 
it is obligatory to not do P, even though P is true in all accessible morally ideal situation.:                          
                        P → (Q → (P & ~P)) 
Proof Suppose we have s╞I P. Then, for any x such that Msx then x╞I P. Let’s then 
also suppose that s╞I Q, thus for any x such that Msx then x╞I Q. According to our 
assumption Q; P├ f, we have by the semantic entailment theorem, x╞I P → f, and by our 
definition of ~ negation, we have x╞I ~P. Since for any x, Msx that x╞ ~P, we have that 
s╞ ~P. Nonetheless, we still have (since every accessible x is an inconsistent point) that 
every x, such that Msx, x╞I P; so we also have s╞I P as desired.  
Theorem 2.5 Unfortunately, similar reasoning shows that with a hierarchy containing 
that P < Q and assuming Q; P├ f, we cannot block the following undesirable feature of 
R. Due to weak commutativity and symmetrical compatibility being a legitimate feature 
of R: 
    P → (Q → (~Q & ~P)) 
We do not want this to be a valid scheme, given that we want a hierarchy with P < Q to 
mean that Q precludes P, not that P also precludes Q25 
Proof Suppose we have s╞I P, then for any x such that Msx then x╞I P. Let’s then 
suppose that s╞I Q, thus for any x such that Msx then x╞I Q. According to our 
assumption Q; P├ f, we have by the semantic entailment theorem, x╞I P → f, and by our 
definition of ~ negation, we have x╞I ~P. By -definition, we infer that s╞I~P. By 
commutativity, Q; P├ P; Q and thus P; Q├ f. Therefore at x we also have x╞I Q → f, and 
                                                 
24 That is, given any arbitrary s such that if s╞ P & Q, then s╞ f , then for any x, for any y such that Rsxy if 
x╞ P and y╞ Q then Nxy 
25 Unless there is also a competing hierarchy, where Q < P… 
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by our definition of ~ negation, we have x╞I ~Q. From -definition, we infer that s╞I 
~Q which was to be proved. 
Proposition 2.0 The attentive reader has probably already guessed at my proposed 
remedy: With a hierarchy containing P < Q when Q; P├ f, and rejecting (weak) 
commutativity and using both ← and →, we can formalize a trumping function that 
returns the following desirable result: 
P → (Q → (~P & ~◊~Q) 
I take this formula to represent the claim that when Q trumps P, even though Q is 
obligatory and P is obligatory, we are obligated to not P when we must choose between Q 
and P. However, it is not the case that we are also permitted or obligated to not Q: it is 
not a matter of moral indifference which one we choose to do. 
Proof Suppose we have s╞I P, then for any x such that Msx then x╞I P. Let’s then 
suppose that s╞I Q, thus for any x such that Msx then x╞I Q. According to our 
assumption Q; P├ f, we have by the semantic entailment theorem, x╞I P → f, and by our 
definition of ~ negation, we have x╞I ~P. By -definition, we infer that s╞I ~P. 
Rejecting commutativity, and with ←I, we also have x╞I f ← Q and by our definition 
of , x╞I Q. So examining every x such that Msx, we find that x╞I P & Q & ~P & 
Q, but there is not a single x, such that x╞I ~Q as desired.       Q.E.D. 
¬ ¬
¬
  The Naturalistic Fallacy 
In the semantics of R, as outlined above, we distinguish between logical 
situations and non-logical situations in order to partly justify and interpret a ternary 
accessibility relation R for relevant implication. However, the distinction between 
situations which are complete and consistent (logical) and those which are either partial 
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or inconsistent (or both) will help also to formalize the claim that it is possible that from 
some point s there are no obligations. 
The culprit in SDL being incapable of formalizing the possibility of no 
obligations claim, is that it is closed under necessitation, i.e.,   
   ├A 
                                                              ├A 
 
With relevant models being populated with both logical and non-logical situations, we 
notice the following semantic fact: 
     s╞I A  
    s╞I A          iff s is logical and for any t, Mst then t is logical. 
 
Consider a partial (and thus non-logical) t, i.e., a situation that for some A, it makes 
neither A nor ~A true. Then even if ╞ A, and Mst (assuming that s is logical, thus s╞I A), 
nonetheless, it is not the case that every x such that Msx, x╞I A as required by the 
definition of : formulae verified by the empty-set can not be automatically verified at 
non-logical situations. The situation t, according to our assumption, is such a situation: it 
lacks the information that ╞ A.  
Moreover, suppose that we do have ├ A; we do not have to worry about being 
able to infer ├ p → A from ├ A in R. Weakening is not a rule in R.  
Summary 
While R seemed able to formalize using genuine moral dilemmas in ethical 
reasoning, and dodged making the naturalistic fallacy valid, there were some problems 
with trumping due to the symmetry of the compatibility relation. Moreover, the order of 
the premise structures in the sequent calculus must be identical to the order in the 
trumping hierarchy. However, it is not immediately clear that such a fit is automatically 
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justified, as we may not be able to switch back and forth from the incompatibility of 
actions and the theories about which moral demands carry more weight. One may have 
very little to do with the other.  
For example, suppose I am a pious Christian, given to taking the Bible literally. 
Imagine then, that I read26 how Jesus said to give all your possessions away to the poor; 
and since no pious Christian should believe that it is possible for any morally ideal world 
to not make the words of Jesus true, I recognize an obligation to give all my money to the 
poor. However, if I give all my money away I will be unable to afford the expensive 
medical treatment required to keep my child healthy. Thus giving all my money away 
precludes me from then keeping my child healthy; however, consider a hierarchy which 
posits that the responsibility to care for one’s dependents should trump giving all your 
money away to strangers: 
M; H├ f  and M<H but s╞ M and s╞ H, where M stands for ‘giving all 
your possessions to the poor’ and H stands for ‘caring for your sick child’. 
What we are looking for is to be able to infer that it is permissible to not give away all 
your money, given that you have a sick child to care for. 
Suppose we have s╞I H, then for any x such that Msx then x╞I H. Let’s then 
also suppose that s╞I M; thus for any x such that Msx then x╞I M. According to our 
assumption M; H├ f, we have by the semantic entailment theorem, x╞I H → f, and by 
our definition of ~ negation, we have x╞I ~H. From D-schema, we infer that there is an 
x╞I ~H, and thus by the definition of ◊, we have s╞I ◊~H. And this is not at all desirable: 
we may interpret this as claiming that it is permissible to not care for your sick child’s 
health.  
                                                 
26 Begging off questions on appropriate exegesis 
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What we do want is that M├ ¬H, which is meant to formalize that we can 
deduce from someone caring for one’s child that the one did not first give away all their 
money. With a deontic interpretation, it may be represent the claim that I can discharge 
an obligation to give all my possessions away, provided that I don’t have a sick child I 
ought to care for. 
Therefore, we need a semantic postulate governing the interaction of a 
hierarchical ordering and the order of premise structures in the sequent calculus; 
moreover, the hierarchical ordering must be able to over-ride the action ordering. If we 
can’t make sense of the hierarchical ordering replacing the action ordering, it seems that 
there is no way to block the inference (that is, without jettisoning the deduction theorem) 
that, since giving all your money away precludes caring for your child’s health, it is then 
permissible to not care for your child’s health if you are obligated to give all your money 
away. And this is incompatible with the basic notion behind the trumping approach to 
resolving conflicting moral demands: that it is not due to merely which action precludes 
which action, but that it should be the hierarchy which alone determines which action 
trumps which action. In appendix A, I sketch out a preliminary attempt at cashing out 
how a hierarchical ordering could replace the prior action ordering. 
Thus by considering the incompatibility of actions at accessible morally ideal 
situations, we end up with a poor approximation of which actions are permissible or 
impermissible. Yet it is the very incompatibility of actions which enables impossible 
moral situations. Therefore, there seems to be considerable tension with simply using ~A 





Multiple-Accessibility Relational Structures 
So far, we have been largely concerned with the relationship between the 
concepts of obligation and permissibility or possibility. However, Peter Schotch and 
Raymond Jennings have argued that a viable formalization of deontic reasoning should 
instead focus on jettisoning the commonly accepted aggregation principle they refer to as 
the K-schema: (P & Q) → (P & Q). In chapter one, we identified a different schema 
as the K-schema, namely: (P→Q) → (P→Q). Nonetheless these two K-schemas are 
equivalent in all normal frames, i.e., frames for which ‘├a→b therefore ├ a→b’ and 
necessitation holds. For the purposes of this chapter, we will be using (P & Q) →(P 
&Q) as our K-schema, keeping in line with Schotch and Jennings usage. 
By ‘aggregation principle’ Schotch and Jennings mean any principle which claims 
that “any finite number of necessities can be aggregated to produce one.”27 The issue that 
Schotch and Jennings take with the aggregation principle expressed by the K-schema, is 
that it is too strong: “it collapses deontically significant distinction between modal 
sentences”28 They argue that the D-schema, that is, P→◊P, and a schema representing 
that there are no obligations to bring about an impossible state of affairs, that is, ~f, 
must be kept logically distinct in any viable formalization of deontic reasoning. However, 
even the weakest modal logic that makes the K-schema valid, will conflate these two 
schemas.  
Proof: Let us suppose that for some x, x╞I P and x╞I ~◊P, i.e. D-schema fails. Thus 
x╞I P and x╞I ~P. From K-schema we infer that x╞I (P & ~P); of course, P & ~P├ 
                                                 




f, and in virtue of ~f, this result demonstrates that we can’t have ~f without making D-
schema valid. Proving the equivalence in the other direction is trivial. 
Schotch and Jennings want to rule out ‘it is obligatory to do the logically absurd’, 
but keep open the possibility that there are conflicting obligations, i.e., those situation 
when we are obligated to A and we are obligated to not A. Thus, the way forward seems 
to require theorists to reject principles which aggregate distinct obligations into one 
comprehensive obligation. We will therefore examine Schotch and Jennings’ proposal to 
block the inference from an obligation to do ‘A’ and an obligation to do ‘B’, to there 
being an obligation to do both ‘A and B’. We will also investigate whether we can make 
any headway in formalizing trumping-like reasoning, and whether Schotch and Jennings’ 
proposal provides a formalization which doesn’t validate inferring an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ 
or ruling out the possibility that there are or were no obligations from some point. 
Schotch and Jennings’ Multiply Accessibility Relations Semantics 
It seems that, at least prima facie, many moral agents are committed to several 
evaluative frameworks at once, rather than one monolithic moral system. Ordinary day-to 
-day ethical reasoning is seemingly characterized by agents switching back and forth, 
sometimes quite unreflectively, from harm-avoidance consequentialist theories of right 
and wrong to duty theories to theories of liberty, even when dealing with the evaluation 
of a single moral situation.  
Consider the common response one may hear when many people find out that a 
lawyer is defending an ‘obviously’ guilty person: how can she, the lawyer, try to get this 
person back on the streets without having to pay for what he or she did? The lawyer may 
agree that while any morally ideal situation is such that her guilty client is locked up, 
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nonetheless she also has a duty to provide the best defense, within reasonable limits, for 
her client. Perhaps her first evaluation may be cashed out as a harm-avoidance claim, 
while the second is best understood as grounded in claims regarding moral limits to what 
can be required of the individual for the sake of the common good. In this case, the 
lawyer is claiming that the second evaluation provides reasons to trump the results of the 
former evaluation, but we will get to that later.  
Moreover, it is common practice, and rightly so, to think that an agent is morally 
deficient in some fashion when he or she utterly disregards the values underlying cogent 
evaluative schemes; especially so, when it just so happens that these other evaluative 
schemes provide evaluations which conflict with their favorite theory. It is not merely 
that such people are being unreasonable for not considering other evaluative frameworks, 
but when anyone rejects the basic values underlying any cogent evaluative framework, 
this reflects poorly on his or her own moral status.  
To enter unabashedly into controversial territory, consider the abortion debate. 
Neither side seems willing to concede that the opposing side is grounded (however 
weakly) on a basic claim of value: that every case of a specific collection of biological 
cells organized in such and such way deserves to be considered of intrinsic moral worth 
and that there are moral limits to what can be required of any individual for the sake of 
the good of others29. Unfortunately, in this often heated debate, proponents of one side 
frequently dismiss the basic values underlying the other sides’ position, resulting not only 
in an all-round unfruitful discussion, but also in people becoming committed to immoral 
claims.  
                                                 
29 Moreover, both sides appeal to both of these claims, in some form, while somehow denying they apply to 
the other position. 
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It thus seemingly behooves theorists to consider whether different theories or 
evaluative schemes pick out different sets of morally ideal situations. For Schotch and 
Jennings, the possible worlds of classical modal logic are sufficient for characterizing the 
appropriate framework of deontic logic. Therefore, given a non-empty set of possible 
worlds, Schotch and Jennings propose that we allow for “two or more notions of 
accessibility to operate simultaneously” in picking out the set of possible worlds we use 
to define moral necessity or equivalently, obligation.  
Definition 3.0 A frame is a relational structure F such that F = <W, 1,..., nR R >, where W 
is a non-empty set of possible worlds and every (1 )iR i n≤ ≤ is a binary relation between 
possible worlds of W. 
Definition 3.1 A model is a relational structure M such that M = <W, 1,..., nR R , I> where 
<W, 1,..., nR R > is a frame and I is an interpretation which associates with every atomic 
sentence of the language a set of possible worlds of W in which the sentence is true.  
Definition 3.2 Moral necessity at a world: ‘w╞I A’ is true iff there is an 
(1 )iR i n≤ ≤ such that x∀ (if iR wx  then x╞I A). 
Definition 3.3 Moral permissibility at a world: ‘w╞I ◊A’ is true iff w╞I ~~A 
Proposition 3.0 The K-schema is not valid in the above class of relational structures. 
Proof: We need a model such that for some w, w╞I A, w╞I B and w╞I ~(A & B). 
Thus we need that there is some (1 )iR i n≤ ≤ such that x∀ if iR wx  then x╞I A, and that 
there is some (1 )iR i n≤ ≤ such that x∀ if iR wx
1 { ,
 then x╞I B. Let i = 1 in the first case and i 
= 2 in the second. Suppose that }R w y= < >  and that 2 { , }R w z= < > . Let y╞I A and 
y╞I ~B and let z╞I B and z╞I ~A, and that there are only the three worlds w, y, and z. 
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Thus x∀ if 1R wx then x╞I A and x∀ if 2R wx then x╞I B, but there is no i (1≤  i  n) such 
that 
≤
x∀ if iR wx  then x╞I A & B. 
We now turn to clarifying how the above class of relational structures will 
nonetheless validate ~f. Similar to the seriality property of SDL, we postulate the 
following existence condition: 
Definition 3.3 Existence condition for Multiple Relations Semantics:  
1:x y R∀ ∃ xy  or…or nR xy  
Proposition 3.1 The above class of relational structures, together with the existence 
condition, validates ~f without validating P→◊P 
Proof: Using classical possible worlds, there is no world x, such that x╞I f. Therefore 
there is always an x such that iR  and x╞wx f. However, suppose we use the same three 
worlds from above, with 1 { , }R w y= < > and that 2 { , }R w z= < > . Let us assume that y╞I 
A and z╞I ~A. This means that w╞I A but w╞I ~◊A, as desired. 
           Genuine Moral Dilemmas 
 Schotch and Jennings’ deontic logic (SJDL) does not remove all constraints from 
what can be inferred from an inconsistent or incompatible set of obligations.  
Proposition 3.2 SJDL does not remove all constraints on what can be inferred from an 
impossible moral situation of type ‘w╞I A, ~A’: 
 The inference P, ~P therefore Q; for arbitrary Q, is invalid in SJDL 
Proof: Suppose again that there are but the three worlds as above and that 1 { ,R }w y= < >  
and that 2R { , }w z >= < . Suppose also that y╞I A and that z╞I ~A, thus w╞I A, ~A, 
but nothing in the semantics forces w╞I Q or y╞I Q or z╞I Q, for some arbitrary Q.  
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Proposition 3.3 SJDL does not remove all limits on what can be inferred from an 
impossible moral situation of type ‘w╞I A, ~A’:  
 The inference P, ~P therefore Q; for arbitrary Q, is invalid in SJDL 
Proof: Suppose that there are but the worlds w, y,  and , and that for any i for1z 2z iR ,  i = 





We also suppose that y╞I A and that ╞I A and ╞I ~A. Therefore w╞I A, ~A. 
However nothing in the semantics forces w╞I Q or y╞I Q or ╞I z Q or ╞I Q for 
some arbitrary Q. 
1z 2z
Proposition 3.4 SJDL does not remove all limits on what can be inferred from an 
impossible moral situation of type ‘w╞I A, B and A & B├ f’’: 
 The inference P, Q, P & Q├f , therefore C; for arbitrary C, is invalid in SJDL 
Proof: For our usual three worlds, suppose that 1 { ,R w y= < >  and that 2 { , }R w z= < > . 
Suppose also that y╞I A. thus y╞I ~B since y is a classical possible world and A & B├f. 
Suppose also that that z╞I B, and z╞I ~A as above. Thus w╞I A, w╞I B. However, 
nothing in the semantics forces that w╞I C or y╞I C or z╞I C, for some arbitrary C.  
    Formalizing Trumping 
 As noted in chapter two, we desire a system that can formalize the notion that 
even though something may be true in every accessible morally ideal situation, it may be 
over-ridden by some other proposition true in every accessible morally ideal situation. 
However, with classical worlds, we are committed to only one member of an inconsistent 
pair being true at a time in any morally ideal world. But with multiple accessibility 
relations in SJDL, perhaps progress can be made towards formalizing how an obligation 
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verified by one accessibility relation may be trumped by another obligation verified by a 
different accessibility relation.  
Proposition 3.5 SJDL is compatible with the claim that when Q; P├ f,  but there is a 
hierarchy such that P<Q, then it is obligatory and permissible to not do P, even though P 
is true in all morally ideal worlds accessible with some R-relation. That is, it is 
compatible with the truth of: 
    P → (Q → (P & ~P)) 
Proof: Suppose that W = {x, y, z} and that 1 { , }R w y= < > } and that 2 { ,R w z= < > . 
Suppose also that y╞I Q. Then y╞I ~P, since y is a classical possible world and P & Q╞f. 
Suppose also that z╞I P. Thus w╞I Q, w╞I P and w╞I ~P, as desired.  
Proposition 3.6 Unfortunately, similar reasoning shows that with a hierarchy containing 
that P < Q and assuming Q; P╞ f, we cannot block the following undesirable feature of 
SJDL: 
P → (Q → (~Q & ~P)) 
We do not want this to be a valid scheme, given that we want a hierarchy with P < Q to 
mean that Q precludes P, not that P also precludes Q. 
Proof: Suppose that W = {x, y, z} and that 1 { , }R w y= < > } and that 2 { ,R w z= < > . 
Suppose also that y╞I Q, therefore y╞I ~P since y is a classical possible world and P & 
Q├f. Suppose also that z╞I P, therefore z╞I ~Q as above. Thus w╞I Q, w╞I P. We 
also have that w╞I ~P, and w╞I ~Q, which was to be shown 
 
 I propose that, once again, in order to formalize trumping hierarchies, we need to 
postulate inconsistent situations 
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Proposition 3.7 With inconsistent situations and multiple accessibility relations we can 
formalize trumping-like reasoning. What we what when P < Q and Q; P╞ f is for this to 
be true: 
P → (Q → (~P & ~◊~Q) 
Proof: Suppose that W = {x, y, z}and that 1 { , }R w y= < > } and that 2 { ,R w z= < > . 
Suppose also that y╞I P and y╞I Q. (We can suppose this by taking y to be an 
inconsistent situation instead of a classical possible world.) Suppose, on the other hand, 
that that z╞I Q, but that z╞I ~P. Thus we have w╞I P, w╞I Q, w╞I ~P but not that 
w╞I ◊~Q, as desired. 
However, with inconsistent situations, we would now have to reconsider how we 
characterize our semantics so as to avoid making w╞ f possible. The non-logical 
situations in this revised semantics are already inconsistent; it seems that we can only 
gain by allowing non-logical situations to also be incomplete. However, to avoid 
verifying obligations to do the impossible, we first must preclude the possibility that our 
non-logical situations can simply make ‘f’ true. Secondly, to rule out cases like ‘w╞ (A 
& ~A)’, the non-logical situations in this revised semantics must also not be closed under 
other classical logical laws, in this case, aggregation:  
Semantic Postulate: Trumping SJDL will not verify the following: 
For any x such that x∈non-logical, if x╞ A and x╞ B therefore x╞ A & B. 
For any x such that x∈non-logical, x╞ f. 
Therefore, in the proof for Prop 3.7, while y╞ P and y╞ Q, since y∈non-logical, there is 
nothing in this semantics which forces that y╞ (P & Q). Therefore we do not have w╞ 
(P & Q) as desired.  
 50
 
These revisions shouldn’t be as troubling as it first appears; non-logical worlds 
are already not closed under explosion, so we might have to make peace with the 
possibility that, in order to formalize trumping-like reasoning, few familiar classical laws 
of logic can apply to morally ideal situations. Thus we justify our semantic rules because 
they characterize what we take as cogent reasoning in our shared experiences of moral 
inquiry, not because the rules are merely familiar and simple to use.  
The Naturalistic Fallacy 
Regardless of how many accessibility relations we have in our semantics, as long 
as it is only consistent and complete points which populate our relational structures, if the 
empty set forces a formula, then every point make that formula true. Therefore, we have: 
   ├A 
                                                              ├A 
 
For any n of nR (1 ≤  n) and for any x for some w, such that nR wx then x╞I A, since in a 
classical model, every x, x W∈ x╞I A.  
 If we have ╞I A, then we can infer that P╞I A, since weakening with the empty 
set is still a valid rule in SJDL: the → is still understood as the horseshoe. That is, if A is 
true at every point, then P→A is also true at every point. Furthermore, if we can infer that 
A from the empty set, we can infer that A from any P as well in classical proof-theory. 
 Thus, we have the following undesirable feature in SJDL: 
                                                          ├ A      (hypothesis) 
                                                        ├ A     (closure under ) 
                                                       p├ A    (weakening) 
                                                       ├ p → A (→I) 
 
If we interpret the operators with deontic terms, we have the inference of an ‘ought’ from 
an ‘is’, as being valid. 
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 Schotch and Jennings claim that necessitation closure is not a “central principle. 
Its function is to allow us to employ a more streamlined semantics than would otherwise 
be possible. Should [this rule] be thought genuinely counter-intuitive, rather than just 
odd, our subscription to it may be terminated. The semantics of the resulting logic(s) 
must then be complicated along lines familiar from the analysis of so-called non-normal 
modal logics.”30 The complicated semantics are as follows: 
We leave behind classical possible worlds semantics for the semantics of non-
logical situations. Fortunately, we have already justified the use of inconsistent situations, 
and situations that are not closed under aggregation; we can only gain, as I argued above, 
by using incomplete situations as well. Thus, since incomplete situations can fail to have 
the information that ├ A, while ├ A necessarily holds for all logical situations, we cannot 
verify the following: 
‘├ A and for any n of nR (1  n) and for any x for some w, such that if≤ nR wx then x╞I A’ 
unless w and x are logical. Thus, closure under necessitation fails in this semantics, since 
we have non-logical situations.  
Summary 
 The system proposed by Schotch and Jennings does provide for the formalization 
of fruitful reasoning from inconsistent or incompatible sets of obligations. However, we 
discovered that in order to formalize trumping and ruling out deriving ‘ought’ from ‘is’, 
classical possible worlds are insufficient for the semantics of SJDL.  
Once we begin quantifying over such a larger class of interpreted objects, we 
found that SJDL quite simply formalized trumping reasoning by using another 
                                                 
30 Pg 159 S&J 
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accessibility relation to pick out a different set of morally ideal situations. With at least 
two sets of morally ideal situations, we can provide the models required by reasoning in 
which one obligation trumps another obligation. Thus we have that both obligations 
remain true at all morally ideal situations accessible with some morally accessibility 





















      Chapter Four 
     Directions for Further Research: 
         Do We Need a Chimera for Deontic Logic? 
 
There is much intuitive appeal in representing obligation and its cognates in terms 
of moral necessity. However, this ‘moral necessity’ should not be represented in a 
straightforward application of classical modal logic. To do so, as we have seen, is to 
unjustifiably preclude a whole range of moral experiences and widely-supported sorts of 
moral inquiry: genuine moral dilemmas and trumping-like reasoning. Moreover, classical 
modal logic is chock full of fallacies of irrelevance, some of which validate deriving an 
‘ought’ from an ‘is’.  
Thus we have investigated representing obligation and its cognates in terms of 
non-classical moral necessity. We considered both a relevant modal logic and a sectoring 
approach to modal logic. While both of these non-classical approaches ably represented 
fruitful reasoning from inconsistent sets of obligations, we were forced to make revisions 
to their standard presentations in order to represent trumping-like reasoning. Furthermore, 
the relevant modal logic straightforwardly precludes the naturalistic fallacy, while again 
we needed to tinker with Scotch and Jennings’ multiple accessibility relation system so as 
to jettison this fallacy.  
Unfortunately, neither non-classical approach neatly satisfies our proposed 
criteria. While both systems satisfactorily block obligation explosion when reasoning 
from an inconsistent set of obligations, substantial revisions were required to account for 
trumping-like reasoning. However, we notice some similarities in the attempts to use 
these systems to formalize deontic logic. First, we were justified in postulating that the 
abstract entities that belonged to the class of morally ideal situations may follow fewer 
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classical logical laws than do situations like our actual world. Secondly, we were forced 
to recognize that permissibility does not have the same tidy relationship as obligation 
does to straightforwardly quantifying over accessible morally ideal situations.  
The differences between how we revised both systems to account for trumping-
like reasoning lie in part in how readily the points in the relational frames of the 
corresponding semantics were ripe for such adjustments. While the relevant logic already 
justified the use of non-logical situations in order to block a long list of fallacies of 
irrelevance, the sectoring approach of Scotch and Jennings initially used the possible 
worlds of classical modal logic, albeit with multiple moral accessibility relations. We 
were unable to simply revise the behavior of these multiple relations so as to represent 
trumping sufficiently. Non-logical situations were called into action, which prior to this 
revision were not considered appropriate points in Scotch and Jennings relational frames.  
In deontic logic, we notice that the order of premises can be, in fact, relevant in 
trumping-like reasoning; that is, if ◊ is defined in terms of the truth of formulas in at least 
one accessible situation. However, in the standard presentation of relevant logic, the 
order of premises is understood as not being pertinent to a correct characterization of the 
consequence relation. Thus, we were forced to make changes in the structural rules of 
relevant logic to accommodate trumping. Moreover, these changes now invalidate the 
inference A→ ~ ~A, which is not one of the inferences we were intending to block in 
appropriate moral inquiry.  
In Schotch and Jennings’ approach, we were initially able to define ◊ in terms of 
~~, which circumvented the issue of trumped obligations being, nonetheless, 
permissible. On the other hand, since we were forced to appeal to inconsistent situations, 
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the classical negation used in Scotch and Jennings’ logic will have to be revised, and in 
so doing, the relationship between ◊ and  in their system will quickly become 
complicated, most likely along the lines of that as seen in our discussion of deontic 
relevant logic. 
The use of multiple, possibly disjoint sets of morally ideal situations, via multiple 
accessibility relations, has much intuitive appeal. We have a robust philosophical 
interpretation of such semantics, using the notion of multiple cogent ethical theories. 
Moreover, if we may characterize trumping reasoning as something like a higher-order 
moral theory which provides reasons why one moral demand should have more weight in 
our moral inquiry than does another, conflicting demand, then multiple, possibly disjoint 
sets of morally ideal situations, as picked out by multiple accessibility relations appear, 
initially, to go far in providing the corresponding semantic structure. 
While less dramatic changes seemed to take place in a relevant modal logic in 
attempts to satisfy our criteria, the philosophical interpretation of its semantics seems less 
elegant and more complicated—perhaps excessively more—than does the interpretation 
of Schotch and Jennings’ semantics. On the other hand, since cashing out the 
consequences of revising Schotch and Jennings’ semantics with non-logical situations is 
beyond the scope of this present work, perhaps we would end up with just as 
cumbersome a philosophical interpretation as it is commonly thought that relevant logic 
possesses.  
In my opinion, to be considered a viable candidate for formalizing deontic logic, a 
logical system will likely have to use multiple accessibility relations for the class of 
relevant modal models; a hybrid between a relevant modal logic and Schotch and 
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Jennings’ deontic logic. Moreover, I imagine that such a hybrid’s non-logical situations 
will not only fail to be closed under excluded middle and explosion, but will also fail to 
be closed under aggregation. While it is merely conjecture, I think that we would then not 
need to jettison weak commutativity from its corresponding sequent calculus. 
Furthermore, if we were able, contrary to how my own intuitions seem to lead, to 
come up with a palatable semantics for double negation elimination in such a system, 
then the hybrid’s ◊ could have the requisite relationship to  so as to straightforwardly 



















Truth conditions for trumping: 
 
We shall write P<Q at x for the situation such that whenever an obligation from 
type P comes into conflict with an obligation from type Q, the obligation from type Q 
trumps the obligation from type P, given the information available at x. Likewise, we 
write A<B at x for the situation such that the set to which B belongs trumps the set 
to which A belongs, given the information available at x.  
Informally, I propose that at w╞ P<Q, i.e., the claim that the obligation to Q 
trumps the obligation to P is justified at w if, and only if, for any logical situation x 
sufficiently similar in the relevant factual and moral respects to w at which P is true, and 
any situation m of the class of morally ideal situations31, there is a logical situation y 
sufficiently similar in the relevant factual and moral respects to w, at which Q is true, and 
which is closer to approximating m than x is. The idea is that we say that Q trumps P 
when, if you were to do some action of type P, you could always have done morally 
better by doing some action from type Q. 
For example, let us assume that I have an obligation to care for a sick parent. Let 
us also assume, for the sake of argument, that I have an obligation to care for a sick 
neighbor. However, consider a situation in which the resources to which I have access are 
so meager, that I can only care for one or the other. Given this assumption, any situation 
in which both obligations are nonetheless discharged by me will be an impossible 
situation. We claim that it is true that the obligation to care for a sick parent trumps the 
obligation to care for a sick neighbor, if and only if, by holding certain relevant facts 
                                                 
31 We note that this definition allows that there may not be a unique set of morally ideal situations for any 
given context. See chapter three for a possible account of formalizing reasoning from multiple, possibly 




from the actual situation constant, like a standard upbringing, social milieu etc., across all 
situations in which I care for a sick neighbor, there will always be a situation, likewise 
similar in all relevant respects to actuality, in which I care for a sick parent and where, 
morally speaking, I would do better by so doing.  
When we say that, for some p, q where p, q are logical situations, that q is closer 
than is p to any situation m of the class of morally ideal situations, we mean that fewer 
relevant factual or moral features would have to be changed at m to exactly resemble the 
situation q than would be the case for m to exactly resemble the situation p. That is, we 
might understand ‘q is closer than p to m’ as representing that the q situation is a better 
approximation of m than is the p situation. 
Generalizing, it seems reasonable that sometimes there may be three sets or types 
of situations, let’s use P, Q, R to refer to the class of situation in which P, Q, and R, 
respectively, are true; it may be that for any situation in which P holds, and for any 
member of Q, it shares more relevant features with some member of R than any member 
of Q. For example, consider any situation of type P such that a reasonable but devout 
leftist would consider it a socialist utopia. Then for any situation (we’ll say it is type Q) 
in which citizens must commodify their labor in order to be socially productive, there 
will be a situation of type R, in which production is organized democratically, which 
would more closely resemble a socialist utopia than would any situation of type Q.  
 
This relation between types of situations then suggests that a ternary relation S on 




Definition 5.0 An S relation on a model: given a model M = <sit, logical, R, S, I> we say 
that SPQR if, and only if, for any P-situation x and for any Q-situation y there is a R-
situation z which shares more relevant features with x than does y. 
 
Definition 5.1 Truth set: We introduce the definition of a truth set A  for any formula 
‘A’, such that A  is the set of situations at which ‘A’ is true according to I. 
 
Definition 5.2 The truth set of situations that share all relevant factual and moral features 
of a situation: We write *w to represent the set of situations which share or make true all 
the relevant factual and moral features of situation w.  
 
Definition 5.3 The truth set of the class of morally ideal situations: We write MI  to 
represent the truth set of the class of morally ideal situations, since we do not preclude 
the possibility that there may be many morally ideal situations.  
 
Definition 5.4 Trumping in terms of S relation: ‘w╞ P<Q’ is true iff 
( , log ) ( * * )m x y x y ical x P w y Q w m MI S MI PQ∀ ∀ ∃ ∈ ∧ ∈ ∩ ∧ ∈ ∩ ∧ ∈ ∧  
 
Proposition 5.0: By the above definition, if P; Q├ f, then it can never be the case that for 
any w, w╞ P<Q and w╞Q<P for any P and Q.  
Proof: To show this, we suppose that if w╞ P<Q then:  
( , log ) ( * * )m x y x y ical x P w y Q w m MI S MI PQ∀ ∀ ∃ ∈ ∧ ∈ ∩ ∧ ∈ ∩ ∧ ∈ ∧  
Likwise, suppose also that w╞Q<P then: 
( , log ) ( * * )m x y x y ical x Q w y P w m MI S MI QP∀ ∀ ∃ ∈ ∧ ∈ ∩ ∧ ∈ ∩ ∧ ∈ ∧  
However, for any x, if x belongs to the truth set of ‘P’, ‘Q’ and ‘w*’, then x cannot be 





















Deontic Negation and Incompatibility 
Recall that formulae deduced from the empty set are true at all logical situations, 
but it is not necessarily the case that such formulae are true at all situations, if we have 
non-logical situations in our semantics. Since we are considering impossible situations as 
being possibly morally ideal, it is not valid to infer from formulae that are true at all 
logical situations that these formulae will also be true at an impossible but morally ideal 
situation. Therefore, M; H├ f does not entail that at non-logical u that u╞ M→(H → f). 
Thus it is at least an open question whether we may do better by appealing to trumping 
relations so as to deduce which formulas are negated at accessible morally ideal 
situations.  
Consider the example from chapter two regarding the conflict that an imaginary 
devout Christian who must decide between giving all his money away and caring for a 
sick dependent. We also stipulated that caring for your dependents should over-ride 
giving all your money away: 
M; H├ f  and s╞ M<H but s╞ M and s╞ H, where M stands for ‘giving all 
your possessions to the poor’ and H stands for ‘caring for your sick child’. 
 
What we would like to be able to infer is that it is obligatory and permissible to 
not give away all your money, given that you have a sick child to care for. We do not 
want it to be permissible nor obligatory to not care for your child. 
 
Consider a logical s such that s╞ M<H and s╞ M&H but that M: H├ f. We now 
introduce a new incompatibility relation N° for deontic logic such that: 
Definition 6.0 With a model M = <sit, logical, S, R, N°, I>, N° is a binary relation on sit 
such that N°xy iff for any P-situation y there is an Q-situation x such that S MI PQ and 
for any x of Q  and for any y of P , P; Q├ f or Q; P├ f (for any logical situation) 
 
Definition 6.1 ~ negation in terms of N°:  
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for any m∈ MI , ‘m╞ ~A’ iff for any y, there is an x such that if y╞ A then N°xy 
 
We can’t have the relation N° being symmetrical, thus we also have to reject weak 
commutativity as a structural rule in any corresponding sequent calculus. And by adding 
←I as a rule, we add a new negation operator, similar to chapter two. 
 
Definition 6.2 ¬ negation in terms of N°: 
for any m∈ MI , ‘m╞ ¬A’ iff for any y there is no x such that if x╞ A then N°xy 
 
Suppose that at s, for any logical M situation M an agent would always do better by 
realizing some logical H situation H instead, given that M and H are sufficiently similar 
to s. 
Therefore, since we can represent this as: 
s╞ ( , log ) ( * * )m x y x y ical x M s y H s m MI S MI MH∀ ∀ ∃ ∈ ∧ ∈ ∩ ∧ ∈ ∩ ∧ ∈ ∧  
we can infer that s╞ M<H 
 
Claim With the incompatibility relation N° we have semantic tools for using the 
hierarchy function in chapter one. We show that:  
 
Since s╞ M<H, we infer that for any m of the class of morally ideal situations, that 
S MI MH. Thus we have for any situation at which H holds and for any situation at 
which M holds, that N°HM which according to our conditions above, gives us: 
1) s╞ H→ ~M  
2) s╞ M→ ¬H32 
 and these formula are the same as the results we desire from our hierarchy. 
 
Recall that the h hierarchy function from chapter one: 
s╞ M &H and s╞ h: for any M, H such that [((H & M) but M; H├ f) & for some 
P, Q (((M∈P & H Q) v (H∈ ∈Q & M∈P)) & ~((M∈P & H P) v (H Q & 
M∈Q))) & (P<Q v Q<P & ~(P<Q & Q<P)
∈ ∈
33)]→ [((Q<P & & M∈P) → ~H) v 




Proof: We claim that if s╞ M & H and s╞ M<H then s╞ ~M & H & M &¬H 
which is what we desire from our hierarchy. We have that for any x if Msx then x╞ M and 
x╞ H. However, since for any w of sit if w is logical, then w╞ (M & H)→ f, therefore 
x∉logical. From s╞ M<H we infer that for any x such that Msx then, since s╞ M & 
H, we have that x∈ MI and thus S MI MH and therefore N°HM. So: for any x such 
that Msx, x╞ ~M & ¬H by both negation definitions. Since for any x such that Msx, x is 
                                                 
32 We can interpret these as follows: 1) if you are obligated to care for your sick child, you are obligated to 
not give all your money away; 2) if you are obligated to give all your money away, then it is impermissible 





an inconsistent situation, we have x╞ M & H & ~M & ¬H. Therefore we have as the 
desired result:    s╞ ~M & H & M & ¬H.  
 
According to the above h, if M; H├ f and s╞ M & H and s╞ P<Q and H∈Q then 
h:~M. There is no model, under these assumptions, that satisfies both N°QP and ~H, 
since we have both negations defined in terms of a non-symmetrical N° for morally ideal 
situations; To show this consider that if s╞ P<Q then, under our assumptions, for any x 
such that Msx, then x cannot ╞ ~H, since it is never the case that N°MH as shown in the 
corollary in appendix A. 
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